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Abstract The prevalence of ownership concentration in Asian firms presents a
challenge to the influential agency theory-based understanding of the role of corporate
boards. In this paper we develop and test hypotheses about board attributes and firm
performance that reflect Asian institutional conditions. We present the first meta-
analysis of the relationship between board attributes and performance of Asian firms
using a varied set of meta-analytical techniques on a database of 86 studies covering nine
Asian countries. First, we find that board structure and composition preferences are
influenced by the identity of the concentrated owner. Second, consistent with US data,
we find very limited evidence of a direct relationship between board attributes and firm
financial performance in the Asian context. Third, we find that the relationship between
board structure and composition and firm performance is mediated by the revealed
strategic preferences of Asian firms specifically by the level of R&D investment.
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that serves to remedy agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and
control in publicly listed firms (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Next to formal
decision-making, the main function of the board is to monitor and discipline
managers, who, for reasons of self-interest and risk-aversion, are presumed to make
decisions and pursue strategies that benefit them at the expense of shareholders. A
common assumption is that the board can best perform its monitoring role when its
members are sufficiently independent to criticize the management’s actions and
policies (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Moreover, boards can be expected to
perform their monitoring role better when the chair of the board is not occupied by
the CEO, as this “CEO duality” is widely held to stand in the way of effective
monitoring practices (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Finally, an efficient
monitoring board will be subject to certain size restrictions that result from the
constraints that apply to effective deliberation and communication within groups
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
This received agency theoretical view of boards in corporate governance has been
subject to critique from a growing number of scholars. First, the empirical evidence
does not bear out the core tenets of this view, producing ambiguous, often even
contradictory findings (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). Second, an agency
theoretical perspective on boards may overlook other important functions of the
board in public firms, such as the function of securing access to key resources for the
firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Third, the agency theoretical view of the role of
boards in corporate governance is premised on a separation of ownership and control
between managers and shareholders that may be valid in the US and the UK, but
occurs less frequently in other parts of the world where concentrated ownership
remains the empirical norm (La Porta, López-De-Silanes, & Shleifer 1999).
In response to these criticisms, this study offers a new appreciation of the role and
functioning of boards in Asian public firms, a subject which has received an
increasing amount of research attention from corporate governance scholars over the
last decade or so. Our aim is to improve understanding of the role of the board in
publicly listed firms that is relevant in the Asian context. To do so we conduct a
meta-analysis on the available empirical evidence in Asian countries concerning the
relationship between ownership structure and board attributes, on the one hand, and
the mediating relationships between board attributes, strategic decisions, and
ultimately firm financial performance, on the other. We examine Asian firms
because they operate in an institutional context where many of the key assumptions
of the agency theoretical view of boards functioning may not hold. First, because
many Asian countries are late industrializers (Amsden, 1991), important country-
level corporate governance institutions, such as disclosure norms and legal
protection for minority investors, have not developed to the same degree as in more
developed countries in the US or Western Europe (Heugens, Van Essen, Van
Oosterhout, 2009; La Porta, López-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Second,
high levels of ownership concentration are common in Asian public firms, where de
facto control is often exercised by families, other firms, or business groups. These
ownership configurations have been associated with the prevalence of agency
problems between the firm’s majority and minority owners rather than between
managers and dispersed shareholders (Yang, Tipton & Li, 2011; Young, Peng,
Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Third, as late industrializers many Asian firms
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face resource constraints (finance, technology, highly educated labor) that they
may address by using board attributes as a means to secure such resources (Peng,
2004). In sum, Asian countries provide an institutional context in which improved
understandings of board structure and functioning can be developed that are more
generally applicable for emerging markets.
We use Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985)
and meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM; Cheung & Chan, 2005)
on a database of 69 published studies and 17 working papers, representing a
maximum of 130 effect sizes and a total of 167,073 firm-year observations for the
main focal relationship. Using MASEM, first, we find that the prevalence of “good
governance” board attributes such as board independence and the separation
between the CEO and chair of the board in Asian firms is at least partly contingent
on the type of owners that control these firms. As might be expected, foreign
ownership increases board independence and decreases CEO duality, on the one
hand, while family ownership decreases board independence and increases CEO
duality, on the other. Yet within the same structural model, second, we do not find a
significant direct relationship between board attributes and firm performance, which
makes Asian firms look more like US firms in this respect than might be expected
(Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand,
1999). Using MASEM, third, we do find, however, that board attributes have a
significant indirect effect on firm performance via different managerial strategic
choices. More specifically, we find that CEO duality and more independent boards
lead to more investment in R&D, while higher levels of R&D investment in turn
have a positive effect on firm financial performance. Finally, we find no evidence for
any mediating effects of other managerial strategic choices, such as the capital
structure and internationalization of the Asian firms investigated.
Theory and hypotheses
The past decade has witnessed an exponential growth of research on corporate
governance in Asia (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Heugens et al., 2009; Young et al.,
2008) and more specifically on the role of corporate boards in Asian publicly listed
firms (e.g., Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2005; Peng, 2004; Tian & Lau, 2001; see
Table 1 in the Methods section). In line with a longer tradition of board studies
in North America (Dalton et al., 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003), researchers
of Asian corporate governance have commonly taken an agency theoretical view of
boards, and have similarly examined the impact of board independence, CEO
duality, and board size on firm financial performance (e.g., Jackling & Johl, 2009).
The prevailing agency theoretical view of boards has guided a strong yet
equivocal tradition of research on board independence, board leadership
structure, and board size in jurisdictions where ownership and control are
separated (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
The separation of ownership and control leads to a conflict of interest between
shareholders and managers, as managers are prone to make decisions that benefit
them at the expense of owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
while also being more risk averse than (dispersed) shareholders who are able to
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diversify firm specific risk over different firms at little additional cost. Because
shareholders in dispersedly owned firms have few incentives to monitor managers
due to the high transaction costs and collective action problems that they face
(Downs, 1957), the board is the most important internal corporate governance
mechanism to remedy the agency problems that result from the separation of
ownership and control in public firms (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983).
In jurisdictions where the separation of ownership and control is common, the primary
function of the board is to serve as a vigilant monitor and guardian of shareholder
interests (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). The vigilant board is best able to perform its
primary role when members are sufficiently independent from management to be able
to exercise their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders (Johnson et al., 1996). In this
view, directors are expected to be independent and possess the required expertise, such
as serving as executives themselves, to exercise good judgment (Wagner, Stimpert, &
Fubara, 1998). Ideally, independent directors should constitute a majority of the board’s
membership to effectively countervail insider coalitions.
Similarly, following from the same agency theoretical logic, a vigilant board is
presumed to better perform their monitoring role when the chair of the board and
CEO roles are occupied by different individuals. The board’s monitoring capacity
can be compromised when the chair and CEO roles are combined in the same
person, an occurrence known as “CEO duality” (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001;
Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). This is because a combined chair and CEO
becomes a very powerful individual who can more easily manipulate the agenda of
board meetings and control the flow of information to the board (Monks & Minow,
2004; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).
Although it has attracted less research (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999), it is often argued
that a vigilant board will be subject to size restrictions that result from the constraints
that apply to effective deliberation and decision-making within groups performing a
monitoring role (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
Larger boards are conjectured to be less cohesive, less focused, easier to manipulate,
and have poorer decision-making capabilities compared with smaller boards (for a
concise overview see Dalton et al., 1999: 675–676), which hampers efficient board
monitoring of managerial policies and decisions (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells,
1998; Yermack, 1996). In sum, the agency theoretical “good governance”
prescription for a vigilant board suggests that shareholder value will be improved
when (1) the board enjoys independence from management, (2) the roles of board
chairman and CEO are separated and held by different individuals, and (3) the
board’s membership is relatively small.
The surge in research into Asian corporate governance in the last decade is in part
driven by the recognition that many of the key assumptions and good governance
prescriptions arising from the agency theoretical view of boards do not hold in the Asian
context (Chen et al., 2011; Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 2011). In particular, research
has established that dispersed ownership is not widespread but that concentrated
ownership is far more prevalent in the region with majority owners, such as
entrepreneur-founders and their families, frequently being involved in firm management
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). A growing body of work suggests that
concentrated ownership surfaces and persists in Asia because it permits owners to
perform several value-creating governance functions in a context where governance
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mechanisms external to the firm, such as legal protection and the market for corporate
control, are absent (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, van Essen,
& van Oosterhout, 2011; Johnson, Schnatterly, Johnson, & Chiu, 2010). In particular,
concentrated owners who are actively involved in the firm’s strategic management may
be viewed as “monitors in place” (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009) where they can
observe executive behavior and exert strong influence over it. Moreover, because
owners enjoy residual returns they have both an incentive and the practical means to
directly monitor the firm’s activities (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and in this regard
concentrated owners may serve as an efficient substitute for a vigilant board.
Nevertheless, even though the monitoring function can be competently performed by
a concentrated owner this does not necessarily diminish the boards’ importance. For
some types of owner the board can play a vital but alternative role of facilitating access to
resources needed for effective firm performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Depending
on its structure, composition, and design, the board can facilitate the acquisition of two
distinct types of resources, which are typically acquired through market transactions in
mature economies. The first are strategic resources, such as high technology and
managerial know-how, that take many years to develop (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), and
that are frequently in short supply in emerging markets (Hobday, 1995). In well-
developed institutional environments strategic resources can be acquired through long-
term contracts but strategic resource acquisition may require alternative modes of
transactional governance in environments where formal contracts are costly to enforce
(Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2010). Specifically, board membership can serve as an “instrument
of security” (Williamson, 1991) for resource providers who make irreversible
investments in a focal firm since it allows for better oversight of the firms activities.
Board membership also provides a conduit through which resource users and providers
can mutually adapt to changing environmental contingencies (Williamson, 1988).
Second, boards can also assist in the acquisition of relational resources (Tsai &
Ghoshal, 1998) which are available locally but can only be accessed through brokered
relationships such as links with resource gatekeepers, politicians, and public officials
(Luo & Junkunc, 2008). The products of relational resources include context-specific
rent-generating opportunities such as access to untendered government contracts,
licenses, soft loans, and inside information about the availability of lucrative business
ventures. In designing their boards to facilitate resource acquisition we expect
concentrated owners to shun any component that would reduce their effective control
of the firm (Coffee, 1999) and we specifically expect them to place little value on
board independence or the separation of the roles of the board chairman and CEO.
This is because the exercise of discretion by owner-mangers can strengthen their
ability to develop rent-generating initiatives (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). For example,
concentrated owners, unchecked by independent internal oversight, enjoy considerable
discretion in cultivating and leveraging their personal social networks (Zahra, 2010).
Discretion is essential to establishing a favorable reputation (Gilson, 2007) and
generating commitment from strategic resource suppliers (Kwon, 2009) when
contractual forms of enforcement are deficient. Owner discretion also facilitates
access to relational resources, which depend upon reciprocity and the expectation that
a favor granted today can be paid back at some future point in time (Zhou & Peng,
2010). In a context of institutional uncertainty a concentrated owner’s exercise of
discretion can provide a source of competitive advantage compared with an executive
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operating under strict oversight by a corporate parent (Carney, 2005). In this respect an
independent board and non-CEO duality may inhibit CEOs’ discretion and lessen their
capacity to enter into relational exchanges.
The appointments of politicians, public servants bureaucrats, and leading business
partners to board membership is a common practice in Asian firms as a means to
“produce licenses, inside information, and protection from state exactions” (McVey,
1992: 22), which can improve a firm’s performance. Accordingly we expect Asian
firms’ boards to have a larger membership as a means of accessing relational
resources. Moreover, because board membership provides a mechanism for strategic
resource providers to serve as a transaction governance device we reason that in
environments where contractual enforcement costs are high, the functioning of the
board as a transaction governance mechanism will become relatively more important
and used more frequently as a means of securing resources. Hence, contrary to the
agency theory good governance prescriptions for efficient board design, we
hypothesize that resource acquisition rather than monitoring concerns drive board
efficiency in Asian firms, see Hypotheses 1a-c:
Hypothesis 1a Board independence is negatively related to firm performance.
Hypothesis 1b CEO duality is positively related to firm performance.
Hypothesis 1c Board size is positively related to firm performance.
Owner identity
While we have argued that agency theory “good governance” prescriptions do not
generally apply in Asian firms with concentrated ownership, we do not believe this
argument applies equally to all owner types. In this section we distinguish between
family, institutional, and foreign owners and argue that owner identity will influence
board design preferences (i.e., board independence, CEO duality, and board size).
Our reasoning is based upon the presumptions that (1) concentrated owners vary in
their capacity for monitoring and (2) that some types of owner have greater resource
needs than others. We hypothesize that these two contingencies will shape preferred
board designs.
Family-owned firm’s board preferences Because a family’s association with a firm is
likely to be intensive and long-term, family members will typically possess the kind
of intimate and detailed inside knowledge that enables efficient monitoring. We
therefore expect family firms to be less concerned with a board’s monitoring
function and more with the board’s resource acquisition function. This resource
acquisition function is likely to be especially pronounced in the Asian family firm
boards, because family firms are likely to need both strategic and relational resources
(Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Chan, 2001). First, because minority investors
confront a risk of expropriation from dominant family owners they will discount
the value of firm equity, which increases their real cost of capital and makes external
financing scarcer (Chen, Chem, & Wei, 2009). Second, due to their preferences for
retaining control, family firms will typically not rely as much as other firms on
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decision-making input from professional management and technical experts (Tsui-
Auch, 2004). Due to both capital and managerial capacity constraints, therefore, family
firms will be relatively limited in their ability to develop strategic resources internally
(Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010) and will typically be more dependent on external
providers of strategic resources. In this regard, they are more likely to use board
membership as a transaction governance device to improve access to strategic
resources. Moreover, insofar as family firms retain their discretion to engage in
relational contracting practices, they may have comparative advantages in generating
relational resources (Zahra, 2010). For this reason we expect family firms to prefer a
board design that maintains their discretion and facilitates access to both strategic and
relational resource providers. See Hypothesis 2a:
Hypothesis 2a Asian family firms will prefer a non-independent board, CEO
duality, and large board membership.
Institutional-owned firm’s board preferences Compared to family firms, institutional
investors will face very different monitoring and resource acquisition challenges.
Institutional owners, first, will typically not have ownership stakes large enough to
control the firms they own for reasons of portfolio diversification (Ferreira & Matos,
2008). Second, because their investments are largely arm’s-length, institutional
investors are not particularly well-positioned to efficiently monitor firm manage-
ment. Finally, because institutional investors use portfolio diversification techniques
to assure returns on investment, they tend to be indifferent to the resource needs of
the firms in which they invest. In many ways, the predicament of institutional
blockholders in Asia is analogous to dispersed shareholders in Western economies
and we propose that they will prefer the classic agency theory prescribed good
governances practices, such as board independence, non-CEO duality, and small
board size. Because institutional owners are likely to have very little influence over
the firms in which they invest we suspect that they will “select” for good governance
and invest only in well governed firms (Chen et al., 2009; Heugens et al., 2009). See
Hypothesis 2b:
Hypothesis 2b Institutionally-owned firms in Asia will prefer an independent board,
separated CEO and Chair roles duality, and a small board membership.
Foreign-owned firm’s board preferences Compared with family and institutional
owners, foreign owners have intermediate capabilities to monitor firm management.
On the one hand foreign owners may “select” for good governance through their
initial investment decisions (Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006), while their ownership
stake provides them with an “insider” status that is likely to provide substantial
influence within the firm. On the other hand their geographical distance from the
firm’s day-to-day operations is likely to be a continuing obstacle to efficient
monitoring. In addition to monitoring, foreign owners are also concerned with the
resource needs of the firms in which they invest. These resource concerns are mixed,
however. Although foreign owners are likely to possess significant strategic
resources that they can bring to the firm (e.g., technology and managerial know-how;
Djankov & Hoekman, 2000), their liability of foreignness and imperfect knowledge of
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local conditions make them acutely aware of their firm’s need to also acquire resources
through local relational channels.
While we have argued that non-independent boards, CEO duality, and larger
boards all facilitate the acquisition of relational resources we argue that non-
independent boards and CEO duality will confer too much power on local
management, which foreign owners will seek to limit. On the other hand, because
large boards are likely to be less threatening to foreign owners, we expect them to
prefer large boards as a mechanism for accessing relational resources. For these
reasons we believe that foreign owners will prefer a mixed and intermediate board
design that balances both resource acquisition and monitoring needs. Specifically, we
reason that foreign owners will seek to reinforce their monitoring capacity by
emphasizing (1) board independence and (2) non-CEO duality. On the other
hand we expect foreign owners to meet their needs for relational resources by
extending board membership to include a larger number of local gatekeepers.
See Hypothesis 2c:
Hypothesis 2c Foreign-owned firms in Asia will prefer an independent board,
separated CEO and Chair roles, and a large board membership.
The mediating role of firm strategic choices
Although researchers have investigated the relationship between board attributes and
firm financial performance of Asian firms, only a few have focused explicitly on the
relationship between board attributes and firm strategic decisions (Abe, 2003;
Ramaswamy, Li, & Petitt, 2004; Yokota & Mitsuhashi, 2008), while none have
examined the mediating role of strategy in the board attributes–firm performance
relationship. Yet our understanding of the corporate governance role of boards in
Asian firms critically hinges on the sense we can make of the mediating role of
strategic choices that these firms make for two reasons. First, our understanding of
the performance effects of board attributes is simply incomplete if we do not know
enough about the mechanisms that drive performance differences between Asian
firms. Exploring the mediating effects of revealed strategic choices appears to be the
theoretically most plausible route to answer this “how” question (Deutsch, 2005).
Second, the performance effects of differential strategic choices arguably are
economically more consequential in corporate governance than the distributional
effects of expropriation, as the latter need not affect value creation (at least not in the
short run). Because many underlying primary studies employ strategically relevant
control variables, we are able to apply meta-analytic structural equations modeling
(MASEM) to explore mediating effects of (1) investments in R&D, (2) capital
structure (leverage), and (3) internationalization, in the board attributes–firm
performance relationship.1
R&D investments R&D investments are risky (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991)
due to their long-term horizon (Laverty, 1996) and high failure rates (Finkelstein &
1 These strategy measures are chosen as they recur frequently in primary studies included in this
meta-analysis.
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Boyd, 1998). Although investments in long-term R&D projects do not guarantee
high returns, continuous innovation is essential to realize growth and sustain
competitive advantage (David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001; Lee & O’Neill, 2003;
Mosakowski, 1993). However, unlike minority investors who can manage the firm-
specific risk of R&D investments by means of portfolio diversification (Hansen &
Hill, 1991), insiders and controlling blockholders, such as family owners, who tend
to retain control over their firm through less independent boards often led by the
CEO, will be risk averse when it comes to R&D investments because they are ill
positioned to diversify firm-specific risk (Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992). As a result of
the board structures adopted by insider blockholders, therefore, insider dominated
Asian firms will be reluctant to appropriately invest in R&D. Although boards
function poorly as monitors in the Asian context, it can nevertheless be argued that
more independent boards and boards with a separate leadership structure will secure
more R&D investment. This is, first, because more independent boards can present a
countervailing perspective against overly risk averse insiders, even if are not able to
determine investment decisions. Second, independent directors may bring knowledge
and financial resources to the firm and so enable greater R&D investment.
Empirical research has largely confirmed the view that firms with high R&D
investments outperform those that invest less (Hill & Snell, 1988; Mosakowski,
1993). We expect this performance effect to be more pronounced in Asian firms,
because as late industrializers Asian firms are generally behind the technology
productivity frontier (Hobday, 1995). Asian firms that invest much in R&D will
enjoy relative advantages over those who invest less.
Capital structure Financial leverage has value enhancing features since debt financing
provides the firm with needed capital to pursue Asia’s abundant growth opportunities.
Yet the concentrated owners that tend to own Asian firms are likely to shun debt
financing not only because it increases their firm’s bankruptcy risk, but also because it
increases the chance that creditors are able to exercise control on account of restrictive
debt covenants and the primacy of creditor rights. Firms led bymore independent boards
and boards with a separate leadership structure, however, are likely to promote more
leverage because it creates more value for shareholders. A recent meta-analysis on board
research by Deutsch (2005) confirms a positive association between the number of
outside directors and debt intensity (cf. Berger, Oefek, & Yermack, 1997 for the US).
We therefore expect more financially leveraged firms to be better able to pursue
growth opportunities on account of their better access to external debt financing.
Internationalization Finally, there is general agreement that the internationalization
of the firm’s activities is positively related to firm performance not only because of
its potential for revenue generation in foreign markets, but also on account of
more efficient supply chain management (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland,
1994). Yet at the same time, internationalization is related to various environ-
mental threats such as foreign exchange risk, limitations of market size, problems
with market efficiency, institutional obstacles, and political risk (Kwok & Reeb,
2000; Lessard, 1985), which tend to be larger in emerging economies (Luo &
Tung, 2007). Concentrated owners may be especially averse to these types of risk.
In line with agency theoretical predictions, Ellstrand, Tihanyi, and Johnson (2002)
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found that firms with more independent boards and a separate board leadership
structure are more inclined to take risks in their international diversification
efforts (cf. Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).
In each of the three strategic decision areas Asian firms concentrated owners’ risk
aversion and control preferences conflict with the tenets of superior financial
performance. However, we propose a “self-control” hypothesis that suggests some
concentrated owners will recognize the disadvantages of their myopic risk and control
preferences and may choose to adopt farsighted self-control mechanisms in order to
secure a long-term horizon in firm decision-making (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). In this
respect, we suggest that owners may choose to “self bind” by adopting a board design
that promotes optimal R&D, leverage, and internationalization decisions and which
can enhance their performance relative to rivals who do not engage in self-
control. Moreover, independent and external directors may bring knowledge and
financial resources to the board that will better enable Asian firms to make
such investments (Peng, 2004). Accordingly we hypothesize that in Asian firms:
Hypothesis 3a Independent boards, non-CEO duality, and small board size is
related to positive financial performance, with higher R&D expenditures mediating
the relationship.
Hypothesis 3b Independent boards, non-CEO duality, and small board size is
related to positive financial performance, with higher financial leverage mediating
the relationship.
Hypothesis 3c Independent boards, non-CEO duality, and small board size is related
to positive financial performance, with higher degrees of internationalization
mediating the relationship.
Methods
Sample and coding
To identify the population of studies on board attributes in Asia, we used four
complementary search strategies. First, we examined five electronic databases: (1) ABI/
INFORMGlobal, (2) EconLit, (3) Google Scholar, (4) JSTOR, and (5) SSRN, using the
following search terms: “board of directors,” “board independence,” “board leadership,”
“board size,” “board characteristics,” “board attributes,” and “CEO duality.” Second, we
conducted a manual search of the 25 most relevant journals in the fields of accounting,
economics, finance, and management. Third, after collecting an initial set of studies, we
used a two-way “snowballing” technique that involved backward-tracing all references
reported in the articles and by forward-tracing all articles that cited the original articles
using Google Scholar and ISI Web of Knowledge. Fourth, we corresponded with 27
researchers that had previously written one or several papers on board attributes in Asia
in which effect size information was not reported. These four strategies yielded a final
sample of 69 published studies and 17 working papers. Table 1 provides an overview of
all the primary studies included in the analysis.
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Table 1 Studies included in the meta-analysis.
Author(s) Year Country Publication
Ang & Ding 2006 SG JMFM
Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, & Zhang 2004 CN JCE
Black & Kim 2007 KR WP
Bonn, Yoshikawa, & Phan 2004 JP ABM
Buck, Liu, & Skovoroda 2008 CN JIBS
Chau & Leung 2006 HK JIAAT
Chen & Jaggi 2000 HK JAPP
Chen, Li, & Shapiro 2009 CN WP
Cheng & Firth 2006 HK MDE
Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom, & Zhou 2007 HK JIFMA
Cheung, Stouraitis, & Wong 2005 HK JEF
Ching, Firth, & Rui 2002 HK WP
Cho & Kim 2007 KR CGIR
Cho & Rui 2007 CN WP
Choi & Hasan 2005 KR FMII
Choi, Park, & Yoo 2007 KR JFQA
Choi & Yoo 2005 KR EP
Colpan, Yoshikawa, Hikino, & Miyoshi 2007 JP ABM
Connelly & Limpaphayom 2004 TH CJE
Conyon & He 2008 CN WP
Dalton & Kesner 1987 JP JIBS
David, Yoshikawa, & Oyanagi 2004 JP WP
Eng & Mak 2003 SG JAPP
Fan, Wong, & Zhang 2007 CN JFE
Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse 2005 TW APJM
Firth, Fung, & Rui 2007 CN JAPP
Firth, Tam, & Tang 1999 HK OM
Guan, Sheu, & Chu 2007 TW JAAB
Gul & Leung 2004 HK JAPP
Haniffa & Cooke 2002 MY AB
Haniffa & Hudaib 2006 MY JBFA
Ho & Wong 2001 HK JIAAT
Hu, Tam, & Tan 2009 CN APJM
Huafang & Jianguo 2007 CN MAJ
Huang, Tsou, Lin 2008 TW WP
Ibrahim, Samad, & Amir 2008 MY WP
Jackling & Johl 2009 IN CGIR
Jaw & Lin 2009 TW IJHRM
Jia, Lee, Moon, & Li 2009 CN WP
Kao & Chen 2004 TW COC
Kim 2005 KR CGIR
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Table 1 (continued).
Author(s) Year Country Publication
Kim & Chizema 2008 KR WP
Kim & Kim 2009 KR WP
Kim & Kim 2008 KR WP
Kim & Lim 2009 KR JBR
Kim & Park 2009 KR WP
Lam & Lee 2008 HK CG
Lee & Chuang 2009 HK MAJ
Leung & Horwitz 2004 HK JIFMA
Leung & Horwitz 2009 HK QFA
Li, Lam, Qian, & Fang 2006 HK MIR
Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Tan 2007 HK RIBF
Li & Wong 2003 CH APJM
Lin 2007 TW COC
Lin 2005 TW CGIR
Lin & Liu 2009 CN CGIR
Lin & Liu 2009 CN JIAAT
Lin, Wei, & Chen 2006 TW IJBGE
Liu & Lu 2007 CN JCF
Ma, Yao, & Xi 2006 CN APJM
Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy 2009 MY IJBM
Muniandy 2007 MY MAJ
Pathan, Skully, & Wickramanayake 2007 TH APFM
Peng 2004 CH SMJ
Peng, Li, Xie, & Su 2009 CN APJM
Phan, Lee, & Lau 2003 SP JMI
Rahman & Ali 2006 MY MAJ
Ramaswamy, Li, Petitt 2004 IN APJM
Ramaswamy, Veliyath, & Gomes 2002 IN MIR
Razak, Ahmad, & Aliahmed 2008 MY WP
Rhee & Lee 2008 KR CGIR
Saravanan 2009 IN WP
Sarkar & Sarkar 2009 IN PBFJ
Singh & Gaur 2009 CN/IN CGIR
Su, Xu, & Phan 2008 CH MOR
Tian & Lau 2001 CH APJM
Van der Zahn 2004 SP IJBGE
Veliath & Ramaswamy 2000 IN FBR
Wan & Ong 2005 SP CGIR
Wei, Lau, Young, & Wang 2005 CN ABM
Wu 2008 CN WP
Yatim, Kent, & Clarkson 2006 MY MAJ
M. van Essen et al.
One of the authors coded all effect sizes between all the variables. To assess
agreement in extracting information from primary studies, another author indepen-
dently coded a sub-sample of 300 randomly selected effect sizes. We then computed
a chance agreement-corrected measure of interrater reliability (Cohen’s kappa
coefficient; Cohen, 1960). The kappa value we obtained was 1.00, signifying a
perfect degree of interrater reliability.
Analysis
We used two kinds of meta-analytical procedures. To test Hypotheses 1a-c, we used
Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analyses (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). In HOMA
there are two methods for combining study estimates. The first, the fixed effects
model, assumes no heterogeneity between study results, and collected effect sizes are
solely corrected for sampling error to explain variability between effect sizes. The
second, the random effects model, assumes that studies estimate different effect
sizes, which are corrected for sampling error plus a value that represents other
sources of variability that are assumed to be randomly distributed (Kisamore &
Brannick, 2008). Because of its more realistic assumptions (Geyskens, Krishnan, &
Steenkamp, 2009) and more conservative estimates, we opted for the random effects
model.
Table 1 (continued).
Author(s) Year Country Publication
Yokota & Mitsuhashi 2008 JP APJM
Yoo 2008 KR WP
Zhu 2007 CN JAAB
Zubaidah, Nurmala, & Kamaruzaman 2009 MY IJEF
Country: CN China; HK Hong Kong; IN India; JP Japan; MY Malaysia; KR Korea; SP Singapore; TH
Thailand; TW Taiwan.
Publication: AB Abacus; ABM Asian Business of Management; APJM Asia Pacific Journal of
Management; APFM Asia Pacific Financial Markets; CG Corporate Governance; CGIR Corporate
Governance: An International Review; CJE Chulalongkorn Journal of Economics; COC Corporate
Ownership and Control; EP Economic Policy; FBR Family Business Review; FMII Financial Markets,
Institutions & Instruments; IJBGE International Journal Business Governance and Ethics; IJBM
International Journal of Business and Management; IJEF International Journal of Economics and
Finance; IJHRM The International Journal of Human Resource Management; JAAB Journal of
American Academy of Business; JAPP Journal of Accounting and Public Policy; JBFA Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting; JBR Journal of Business Research; JCE Journal of Comparative
Economics; JCF Journal of Corporate Finance; JEF Journal of Empirical Finance; JFE Journal of
Financial Economics; JFQA Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis; JIAAT Journal of
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation; JIBS Journal of International Business Studies;
JIFMA Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting; JMFM Journal of Multinational
Financial Management; JMI Journal of Managerial Issues; MAJ Managerial Auditing Journal; MDE
Managerial and Decision Economics; MIR Management International Review; MOR Management and
Organization Review; OM Omega; PBFJ Pacific-Basin Finance Journal; QFA Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting; RIBF Research in International Business and Finance; SMJ Strategic
Management Journal; WP Working Paper.
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HOMA procedure
The effect size statistics we use for the HOMA are the Pearson product–moment
correlation r and the partial correlation coefficient rxy.z. r is commonly used in meta-
analysis, because it is an easily interpretable and scale-free measure of linear association.
rxy.z represents the strength between two variables, controlling for the influence of
other variables (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007). In order to extract partial
correlation coefficients from primary studies, studies must use firm performance as a
dependent variable (Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 2008).2 An important question in
HOMA is how to deal with studies that contain multiple measurements of the focal
effect (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001). In our study, multiple measurements of the focal
relationships are often reported due to different simultaneous operationalizations of
board characteristics or performance measure. The issue at stake here is the trade-off
between stochastic independence of the various effect sizes in the analysis on the one
hand, and the use of all available information on the other. A Monte Carlo simulation
by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) shows that procedures using the complete set of
measurements outperform those representing each study by only a single value (such
as a single best indicator or a composite measure) in areas like parameter significance
testing and parameter estimation accuracy. We therefore decided to include all
available measurements in our study. To arrive at an appropriate estimate of the meta-
analytic mean effect size, we had to account for differences in precision across effect
sizes plus variability in the population of effects (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). These
differences derive from differences in the sample sizes of the underlying primary
studies on which the effect sizes are based, plus a constant that represents the
variability across the population effects. Hedges and Olkin (1985) demonstrated that
the optimal measure of precision for a given effect size is the inverse variance weight
w: the inverse of the squared standard error value of the effect size.3 With the
help of these weights, we can subsequently calculate the meta-analytic mean effect
size, its standard error, and the corresponding confidence interval.4
MASEM procedure
To test Hypotheses 2a-c and 3a-c we used meta-analytic structural equation modeling
(MASEM; Cheung & Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). This procedure
combines the techniques of structural equation modeling with those of meta-analysis
and allows us to simultaneously estimate (1) the effect of the owner identity on board
attributes, (2) the direct effect of board attributes on firm financial performance, (3) the
2 The partial correlation coefficient is calculated as follows:
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
t2
ðt2þdf Þ
q
, where t is the t-statistic and df represents
the degrees of freedom. Note that this formula will always produce positive numbers, so it is necessary to
convert it to negative numbers if the regression coefficients are negative (cf. Greene, 2008, Chapter 3).
3 w is calculated as follows: wi ¼ 1se2i þ v^q , where SE is the standard error of the effect size and v^q is the
random effects variance component, which is in turn calculated as: s:e:ðzrÞ ¼ 1ffiffiffiffiffiffin3p , and the formula of
random effect variance is: v^q ¼ QTk1
P
w
P
w2
P
w
 
4 The meta-analytic mean is calculated as follows: ES ¼
P
ðwESÞ
P
w
, with its standard error: seES ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
P
w
q
,
and with its 95% confidence interval computed as: Lower ¼ ES  1:96ðseESÞ, Upper ¼ ES þ 1:96ðseESÞ
M. van Essen et al.
effect of ownership identity and board attributes on a firm’s revealed strategy choices,
and (4) the consequences of these choices for firm financial performance (see
Figure 1). Firm size was included to capture size-related board attribute contingency
effects (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). All variables are
described in Table 2.
We conducted structural equation modeling using a two-stage procedure. In the first
stage, effect size information for all possible correlations between predictors and criterion
variables are combined into pooled estimates to produce a synthetic correlation table
(Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). In the second stage, the synthetic correlation matrix is
treated as the observed correlation matrix and subjected to regular maximum likelihood
structural equation modeling routines (Cheung & Chan, 2005). In this procedure, the
harmonic mean number of observations of all included effect sizes (= 2,029) is treated
as the observed number of observations in order to compute correct but conservative
t-values for the model parameter estimates (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).
Results
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for board attributes and ownership concentration.
The table shows that board independence ranges from 23% in Japan, to 54% in
Figure 1 MASEM analysis
Table 2 provides definitions and representative measures of the constructs used in MASEM.
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Table 2 Definitions of the variables.
Construct Definition and measure
Board independence Construct definition: The extent to which the board of directors operates
independently from corporate insiders.
Representative measures: % of outside directors, dummy outside directors
(Filatotchev et al., 2005; Peng, 2004; Tian & Lau, 2001).
CEO duality Construct definition: Situation where the positions of board chairman and
CEO are held by one individual.
Representative measures: Dummy variable coded 1 for CEO duality and 0
for non-duality (Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom, Zhou, 2007).
Board size Construct definition: Total numbers of directors who serve on the board.
Representative measures: Number of directors (Filatotchev et al., 2005;
Tian & Lau, 2001).
Accounting performance Construct definition: The extent to which firms generate accounting-based
profits.
Representative measures: ROE, ROA, ROI, ROCE, EPS, and profit margin
(Sarkar & Sarkar, 2009; Singh & Gaur, 2009).
Market performance Construct definition: The extent to which firms generate market-based
profits.
Representative measures: Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio, and stock
returns (Filatotchev et al., 2005).
Leverage Construct definition: Avariable which reflects the degree of leverage
of the firm.
Representative measures: Ratio of debt to equity, ratio of total debt to total
assets (Guan, Sheu, & Chu, 2007).
R&D Construct definition: The extent to which a firm invest in R&D projects.
Representative measures: Ratio of R&D to total sales (Choi, Park,
& Yoo, 2007).
Internationalization Construct definition: The extent to which a firm relies on foreign markets for
customers and factors for production and the geographical dispersion
of this reliance.
Representative measures: Number of foreign subsidiaries, ratio of export
to sales (Choi et al., 2007).
Foreign ownership Construct definition: The extent to which ownership is in the hands of
foreign owners.
Representative measures: % foreign ownership, dummy variable coded 1
for presence foreign ownership (Choi et al., 2007).
Institutional ownership Construct definition: The extent to which ownership is in the hands of
institutional investors.
Representative measures: % institutional ownership, dummy variable coded
1 for presence institutional ownership (Filatotchev et al., 2005).
Family ownership Construct definition: The extent to which ownership is in the hands of
family owners.
Representative measures: % of ownership, dummy variables coded 1 for
presence family ownership (Filatotchev et al. 2005).
Firm size Construct definition: The size of the firm.
Representative measure: Total assets, market capitalization, number of
employees, total sales (Singh & Gaur, 2009).
M. van Essen et al.
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Thailand. Additionally, Japanese firms on average have the lowest fraction of CEO
duality (.11) while Hong Kong firms have the highest occurrence of CEO duality
(.43). Furthermore, it is seen that Japanese firms have an average board size of
25.52. This value is considerably larger than the mean board size of firms in the
other Asian nations, which in the remaining countries ranges on average from
7.30 to 10.68.
HOMA results
Board independence and firm financial performance Table 4 reports the HOMA
results for board independence and firm financial performance using r and rxyz
respectively, as effect size statistics. The overall mean r for the relationship between
board independence and firm financial performance is .03, based on 130 samples.
The associated 95% confidence interval around the mean effect size does not include
zero, indicating a statistical significant relationship (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). The
results for the partial correlation-based HOMA are similar (mean rxyz = .02; k = 90),
indicating that board independence is positively related to firm financial performance
in the Asian context. These results therefore do not support Hypothesis 1a.
However, two important qualifications need to be made in interpreting these
meta-analytic results. First, the mean effect size we found is very small by
conventional standards (Cohen, 1977), implying that the economic effect of board
independence on firm performance is very modest in the Asian context. This finding
is consistent with Dalton et al. (1998) who found little evidence of a systematic
relationship between board independence and firm performance in the US context.
Second, the mean effect sizes reported show significant differences between
countries. In Korea (.05 vs. .05) and Taiwan (.06 vs. .02), for example, more
independent boards are positively correlated to firm financial performance, while in
the remaining countries no significant effect could be identified. We return to this
observation in the discussion section of this paper.
CEO duality and firm financial performance Table 5 provides the HOMA results for
CEO duality and firm financial performance. The overall mean r and rxyz of the focal
relationship are both .01 and are not significant. These results indicate no empirical
support for the expected positive relation between CEO duality and firm financial
performance in Asia, implying that Hypothesis 1b must be rejected. Again, results
are different for different countries as the effect of CEO duality is positive and
significant in China, while no consistent significant effect exists for other Asian
countries.
Board size and firm financial performance Table 6 contains the HOMA results for
the relationship between board size and firm financial performance. The overall
mean r for the focal relationship is .03, based on 88 effect sizes. The confidence
interval does not include a zero, indicating a statistical significant relationship. Yet
the partial correlation-based mean rho is −.03, based on 51 effect sizes, while the
corresponding confidence interval includes zero at a five percent level, implying that
there is no statistically significant relationship at a five percent level and significant
negative relationship at a ten percent level between board size and firm performance
M. van Essen et al.
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once certain variables are controlled for. On balance we find no support for
Hypothesis 1c. Once more, the economic effect of board size on firm financial
performance varies across Asian countries. In Japanese firms which have very
large boards, board size is strongly negatively related to firm financial performance
(−.13 vs. −.17), while in Hong Kong and Thailand, smaller boards also enhance firm
financial performance. For other Asian countries, no significant effect could be
identified. Note that this observation only holds for the partial correlation-based HOMA
analysis. In sum, there is little support for any direct relationship between board
attributes financial performance in Asia, as none of our hypotheses on the performance
implications of board attributes of Asian firms were supported. Although, we found
modest support for the agency theory good governance hypotheses pertaining to board
independence, but the effect size was very small.
MASEM results
Table 7 depicts the meta-analytic correlation matrix. The cells below the diagonal
represent separate meta-analyses and report the meta-analytic mean correlation and
the standard deviation (s.d.ρ) for each relationship, which stem from 55 HOMAs.
The cells above the diagonal report the total number of observations (N) as well as
the total number of samples (k) on which the meta-analytic mean is based. Since no
primary study included all correlations of interest, the total number of samples
exceeds the number of samples in any single cell. Mean effects and standard
deviations printed in bold indicate the presence of moderating variables, which is
determined by a significant Q-test. Table 8 contains the MASEM results. The model
fits the data reasonably well (χ2 = 33.04; CFI = .97; RMSR = .02).
Ownership identity and board design preferences As predicted by Hypothesis 2a,
the MASEM model reveals that family ownership has a significant negative
effect on board independence (β = −.12, p < .01) and a positive effect on CEO
duality (β = .08, p < .01), suggesting that family owners prefer a board structure
that retains the discretion required for securing access to critical resources
through relational channels. However, family owners do not use larger boards in
this manner since the MASEM results show family ownership has a negative
effect on board size (β = −.07, p < .01). Also interesting is that family ownership
is positively related to firm financial performance (β = .05, p < .05). Apparently,
the combined benefits of family monitoring advantages (Burkart, Panuzzi, &
Shleifer, 2003) and discretion to engage in relational contracting is sufficient to
outweigh its costs such as extracting perquisites for family members (Anderson &
Reeb, 2004). Finally, family-controlled firms rely less on external financing (β = −.12,
p < .01), as family-controlled firms prefer financing forms that are associated with low
probabilities of default (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). For the remaining strategies no
significant effect could be identified.
Contrary to Hypothesis 2b, institutional ownership affects neither board
independence (β = −.03, p > .10) nor board leadership structure (β = −.00, p > .10),
while it is positively related to board size (β = .05, p < .05). These results question the
view that institutional investors can effectively pressure Asian firms to adopt
conventional board reforms inspired by an agency theoretical logic (Bathala & Rao,
M. van Essen et al.
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1995). Nevertheless, the model suggest that institutional ownership positively affects
firm financial performance (β = .09, p < .01). Moreover, institutional-owned firms are
more internationalized (β = .05, p < .05) than other Asian firms. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2c, foreign owners are effective in securing more independent directors on the
board (β = .05, p < .05) and establishing a separate board leadership structure (β = −.05,
p < .05). The results suggest that foreign owners possess sufficient influence to bolster
their monitoring abilities by establishing good governance practices in the firms they
invest in (Douma et al., 2006; Heugens et al., 2009). There is little support for the
resource-seeking logic of large boards as foreign ownership has no significant effect on
board size (β = .01, p > .10). Consistent with a recent meta-analysis by Heugens et al.
(2009), foreign ownership contributes positively to firm financial performance (β = .09,
p < .05). Finally, foreign ownership has a positive effect on R&D (β = .10, p < .01) and
a negative effect on leverage (β = −.13, p < .01). No effect could be identified on
internationalization (β = −.01, p > .05).
The mediating role of firm strategic choices The results contained in Table 8 also
provide partial support for Hypothesis 3a, namely that board independence
positively affects R&D intensity (β = .06, p < .01) and that R&D positively affects
firm financial performance (β = .07, p < .01). However contrary to expectations,
CEO duality has a positive effect on R&D intensity (β = .18, p < .01), meaning that
Asian firms with dual board leadership structure invest more in R&D projects than
firms which rely on a separate board leadership structure. As observed above, R&D
intensity is positively correlated with firm financial performance. Independent
boards are therefore best interpreted to be complementary with CEO board
leadership in regard to R&D investments as these kinds of investments seem to
require strong but accountable CEOs.
With regard to capital structure decisions, board independence has a negative but
insignificant effect on leverage (β = −.02, p > .10). Additionally, leverage does not
have a significant effect on firm financial performance at a 5% level (β = −.00,
p > .10; β = −.04, p < .10). The relationship between CEO duality on leverage is
negative but insignificant (β = −.02, p> .10) and leverage has a negative but
insignificant effect on performance. We must therefore reject Hypothesis 3b.
With regard to internationalization, board independence has a positive but insignificant
effect on internationalization (β = .02, p > .10), while in turn internationalization has no
significant effect on firm financial performance (β = −.01, p > .10). CEO duality has a
negative but insignificant effect on internationalization (β = −.02, p > .10), while
internationalization has no significant effect on firm financial performance. These results
suggest that chosen internationalization strategies do not mediate the board design–
performance relation. We therefore reject Hypothesis 3c. The model reveals a negative
but insignificant effect of board size on: R&D intensity (β = −.01, p > .10),
internationalization (β = −.00, p > .10), and leverage (β = −.00, p > .10). Against our
predictions, these findings indicate that board size is largely inconsequential in the Asian
context, either directly (see also Table 6) or indirectly through the observed strategic
choice include in our analysis. Finally, as the direct effect between board independence
and firm financial performance is insignificant, we must conclude that the relationship
between board independence and firm financial performance in the Asian context is
fully mediated by the board’s strategic decisions to invest in R&D.
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Discussion
An overall conclusion of our research is that the board attributes that are held to
exemplify good governance practices do not seem to matter much in Asian firms, as
neither board size nor board leadership structure have a statistically significant direct
effect on corporate performance, while the significant positive effect of board
independence on performance is very small by any conventional standard, and is
arguably too small to have much practical significance (Cohen, 1977). Two possible
reasons for the absence of a strong relationship between board structure and
corporate performance not considered in this paper are that, first, the “good
governance” movement is of relatively recent provenance in Asia, dating from the
post-crisis events of 1997, and it may be too early to assess whether such governance
reforms that have occurred have yet to have a significant impact on corporate
performance. A second reason could be due to “measurement error,” suggesting that
during the catch-up phase of economic development corporate leaders are more
interested in achieving firm growth and capability building rather than maximizing
their financial performance (Amsden, 1991). It is possible that with economic
maturity corporate leaders in Asian economies will increasingly turn their attention
to achieving efficiency and improving financial performance.5
Ironically, these absent or marginal performance consequences of board attributes
make Asian firms look very much like their US counterparts, as research thus far has
hardly revealed any statistically or practically significant relations between board
attributes, on the one hand, and firm performance on the other (Dalton et al., 1998;
Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2000; Wagner et al., 1998). Conversely,
neither do these results provide much support for our hypotheses that the board
attributes provide a resource acquisition rationale in the context of weak legal and
market supporting institutions.
Notwithstanding these observations, this paper makes three contributions to our
understanding of the corporate governance role of boards in the Asian context. A
first contribution is that boards apparently play only a derivative role in Asian firms
as they are often only a function of the ownership structures and identities that
prevail in Asian forms. A second contribution concerns the mechanisms through
which board attributes influence firm performance indirectly. A third contribution
pertains to (institutional) differences between different Asian countries included in
this study.
Ownership and boards in the Asian context
Our study provides solid indications that the corporate governance role of the board is
affected by the prevailing ownership constellation in the Asian context. More
specifically, we find that different types of owners affect board composition
differentially, with foreign owners increasing board independence and decreasing
CEO duality, on the one hand, and family owners decreasing board independence and
increasing CEO duality, on the other. Consistent with research on ownership in the Asian
context (Heugens et al., 2009), we also find evidence that large blockholders provide
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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an efficient substitute for boards in Asian corporate governance, as family,
institutional, and foreign owners all have a significant positive direct effect on firm
performance, while the performance consequences of board attributes are largely
inconsequential within the same model. So what do these results tell us about the
global validity of the agency theoretical view of boards in corporate governance?
In our view there is a nuanced story to tell about the applicability of agency theory to
the Asian context. Our study supports the view that boards are not the most important
internal corporate governance mechanism in the Asian context, as ownership
presumably has a superior claim to that title. Yet this does not imply that agency theory
is irrelevant in corporate governance research of Asian firms for several reasons. First,
this is because we do find significant positive indirect effects of board attributes on firm
performance that run through R&D investments, indicating that boards are not entirely
inconsequential in the Asian context. Second, agency theory can contribute to
understandings of agency problems that arise between different kinds of concentrated
owners found in the region and which are now beginning to attract the attention of
researchers (Heugens et al., 2009; Yoshikawa, Phan, & David, 2005; Young et al.,
2008). Finally, the explanatory power of agency theoretical predictions is most
appropriately evaluated in conjunction with other theoretical frameworks, such as
resource dependence theory, for example.
How boards matter: The mediating role of strategic decisions
Although we find no evidence that board attributes are directly related to firm
performance in the Asian context, we do find an indirect relationship that runs
through the level of R&D investments. From an agency theoretical perspective this
result seems somewhat contradictory, as both board independence and CEO duality
have a positive effect on the level of R&D investments while only the former is
consistent with this perspective’s predictions. We can make sense of this finding,
however, if we put away our agency theoretical glasses for a moment, as would be
justified for reasons discussed above. The relationship between board independence
and R&D investments, on the one hand, can be seen to make sense if we interpret
the presence of independent external directors on the board as conduits through
which the firm can acquire resources that are critical for successful R&D
investments, such as technology, knowledge, and financial capital. The presence of
a joint board leadership structure, on the other, may facilitate the exercise of
discretion promoting unified and bold but accountable decision-making that is
needed for investments in high-risk projects. This conjecture is consistent with
research on ownership that finds that certain types of blockholders indeed promote
risky investments in R&D for similar reasons (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009).
In general, research on the role and functioning of boards in Asian firms could
benefit from the adoption of a more behavioral perspective and the explicit inclusion
of strategy variables in the analysis (Deutsch, 2005). Although we found no
significant mediating effects in regard to the capital structure choices and
internationalization strategies of the Asian firms included in our analysis, we were
confined to the variables reported in the primary studies that underlie our meta-
analyses. Future research on Asian corporate governance would therefore be
wise to include strategy variables from the onset. Of particular interest, in our
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view, would be the question how Asian firms respond to the globalization of
trade and investment in the Asian region, and how both governance and
strategy variables relate to their success in doing so. Given the prevalence of
relational business practices in Asian countries, Asian firms pursuing interna-
tionalization strategies are bound to run into the limits of relational exchange
which is inherently constrained in terms of both the number of business
partners and the distance at which these are located.
Unpacking the Asian business context
Finally, the lack of statistically or practically significant relationships between board
attributes and the performance of Asian firms reported in this study may be the result
of relevant differences between Asian countries. Political, institutional, and
economic development varies significantly between different Asian countries, and
so do their corporate governance systems (Heugens et al., 2009) as these tend to be
differentially configured from different elements within the political, economic, and
institutional constraints provided by an individual country (Aguilera & Jackson,
2003; Engelen & Van Essen, 2010). As a result of these differential contextual
factors, the corporate governance role and functioning of the board of directors may
vary considerably between different Asian countries.
Our analyses provide indications that this is the case indeed. First, Table 3
provides evidence that Asian countries differ in the board attributes of their public
firms, with Japan differing considerably from most other Asian countries. Second,
our HOMAs show different mean meta-analytic effect sizes for different Asian
countries. Thus, for example, the relationship between board independence and
performance (see Table 4) is significantly positive in South Korea (rxy.z = .05), while
the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (see Table 5) is
significantly negative for Malaysia (rxy.z = −.03). More strikingly even, the
relationship between board size and firm performance (see Table 6) is strongly
negative for Hong Kong (rxy.z = −.13), Japan (rxy.z = −.17), and Thailand (rxy.z = −.24).
To understand the impact of country-level differences on our focal relation-
ships, one would need to “unpack” the proper names denoting different Asian
countries in terms of variables that measure their differences (Przeworski &
Teune, 1970), and subsequently carry out a meta-analytic regression analysis
(MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) on the effect size distributions of the focal
relationships at stake here (Carney et al., 2011; Heugens et al., 2009). Examples of
relevant country-level variables that could be included in this analysis are
economic development, liquidity, the degree of legal enforcement in a country,
and the average level of ownership concentration in Asian counties. Unfortunately,
the number of countries about which board studies have been carried out to date is
simply too small to do so in the present paper. As studies about more Asian
countries become available, future research should attempt to model these country-
level differences in order to understand the corporate governance role and
functioning of boards in what presently is one of the world’s most dynamic and
fastest growing regions in the world.
The policy implications of our analysis suggest that good governance principles
for boards of directors prescribed by international organizations, such as the OECD
M. van Essen et al.
and World Bank, may be misplaced in the case of Asian firms because these
principles focus upon making corporate boards better representatives of dispersed
shareholders and more efficient monitors of the firm’s management. But close
monitoring of management is not an urgent concern in a context where ownership
and management is united in the same individuals. In settings such as these a more
pressing concern is resolving conflicts between minority and controlling share-
holders. For example, the prescribed separation of chairperson and CEO roles
focuses upon the conflict between the corporate board and CEO but this is not the
primary conflict in Asian firms (Zhou & Peng, 2010). Moreover, the prescribed
duality of the two senior positions is unlikely to have much effect on a controlling
shareholder’s ability to expropriate minority investors (Chen et al., 2011).
Similarly, there is little available evidence to suggest that independent directors
are more likely to prevent the expropriation of minority investors (Chen et al., 2011).
For example, due to the prevalence of business group affiliation and informal
linkages among Asian firms, nominally independent directors (i.e., individuals with
no formal position within the firm) may in fact be closely connected to a controlling
shareholder with little interest in protecting the interests of minority investors.
Unfortunately, little is known about the kinds of board attributes that could mitigate
conflicts between controlling and minority investors. More research on this point is
therefore warranted.
Conclusion
So do “good governance” prescriptions for the board of directors apply to Asian firms?
On the evidence assembled in this paper we suggest that they do not. This may not be
too much of a surprise since good governance prescriptions apply only tenuously in
Anglo-Saxon economies where these prescriptions originated. While this paper finds
no direct relationship between board attributes and the performance of Asian firms, it
does point at the somewhat derivative role of the board in Asian firms, on the one
hand, and at least one concrete mechanism through which board attributes do
indirectly affect firm performance, on the other. But these are telling findings that
could inspire future research on the corporate governance of Asian firms.
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